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AIDA JUST AND CHRISTOPHER J. ANDERSON*
Little is known about how immigrants participate in politics and whether they transform political
engagement in contemporary democracies. This study investigates whether citizenship (as opposed to
being foreign-born) affects political and civic engagement beyond the voting booth. It is argued that
citizenship should be understood as a resource that enhances participation and helps immigrants
overcome socialization experiences that are inauspicious for political engagement. The analysis of the
European Social Survey data collected in nineteen European democracies in 2002–03 reveals that
citizenship has a positive impact on political participation. Moreover, citizenship is a particularly powerful
determinant of un-institutionalized political action among individuals who were socialized in less
democratic countries. These ﬁndings have important implications for debates over the deﬁnition of and
access to citizenship in contemporary democracies.
In 2003, roughly 23 million people living in the member states of the European Union had
been born outside of the country they resided in. From all over the world, they constituted
between around 1 per cent (Lithuania, the Czech Republic) and 35 per cent (Luxembourg) of
their host country’s populations. While many of these immigrants moved to their adopted
countries in the process of decolonization (like South Asians to Britain or North Africans
to France), others came as guest-workers to help build and sustain European economies in
the aftermath of the Second World War (e.g., Turks and Yugoslavs in Germany and
Denmark) or arrived as refugees seeking to escape war and persecution from countries such
as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka.1 Remarkably, at the dawn of the new millennium,
foreign-born persons constituted more than 10 per cent of the total population in many
European nations, with countries such as Austria, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Ireland,
Germany and Sweden recording proportions of foreign-born residents as high as or even
higher than those found in traditional immigration countries like the United States.2
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Undoubtedly, immigration leaves a mark on the political, economic and social life of
both immigrant sending and receiving countries; conversely, receiving countries shape the
lives immigrants lead.3 The rioting in French banlieues, protests in Denmark against
cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, and lobbying in favour of new mosques in Germany
or Muslim women’s right to wear veils are only the most conspicuous examples of a
growing awareness among immigrant communities across Europe that politics inﬂuences
their rights and interests. Given the increasing dependence of European economies on
foreign-born labour, legions of retirees on the horizon and the potential for conﬂict, one
critical issue on the minds of voters and policy makers alike is the smooth and successful
integration of foreign-born residents into the political fabric of receiving countries.
To date, the political impact of migration has been studied mainly with an eye towards the
immigration-related attitudes and behaviour of native populations,4 or the immigration
policies pursued by host governments.5 As a consequence, we know little about immigrants
themselves – in particular, whether participation patterns vary between natives and migrants,
or among migrants themselves.6 Alongside this, we have limited information about the
(F’note continued)
Paris, 2006). The average foreign-born share of the population is about 5 per cent across all member states
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3 See, for example, Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration: International
Population Movements in the Modern World, 4th edn (Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009);
Wayne A. Cornelius, Takeyuki Tsuda, Philip L. Martin and James F. Holliﬁeld, eds, Controlling
Immigration: A Global Perspective, 2nd edn (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004).
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Sentiment, Policy Preferences and Populist Party Voting in Australia’, British Journal of Political Science, 36
(2006), 341–58; Joel S. Fetzer, Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the United States, France, and Germany
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Paul M. Sniderman, Louk Hagendoorn and Markus Prior,
‘Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities’, American
Political Science Review, 98 (2004), 35–49.
5 Jeannette Money, ‘No Vacancy: The Political Geography of Immigration Control in Advanced
Industrial Countries’, International Organization, 51 (1997), 685–720; Jeannette Money, Fences and Neighbors:
The Political Geography of Immigration Control (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999); Erik Bleich,
Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking Since the 1960s (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003); Randall Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional
Origins of a Multicultural Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Marc Morje´ Howard, ‘The Impact
of the Far Right on Citizenship Policy: Explaining Continuity and Change’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies, 36 (2010), 735–51; Simon Hix and Abdul Noury, ‘Politics, Not Economic Interests: Determinants of
Migration Policies in the European Union’, International Migration Review, 41 (2007), 182–205.
6 There is a small number of studies that focus on immigrant political engagement in one or a few
European countries or cities; see, e.g, Marco Giugni and Florence Passy, ‘Migrant Mobilization between
Political Institutions and Citizenship Regimes: A Comparison of France and Switzerland’, European
Journal of Political Research, 43 (2004), 51–82; Ruud Koopmans, ‘Migrant Mobilization and Political
Opportunities: Variation among German Cities and a Comparison with the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30 (2004), 449–70; Ruud Koopmans and Paul
Statham, ‘Challenging the Liberal Nation-State? Postnationalism, Multiculturalism, and the Collective
Claims-making of Migrants and Ethnic Minorities in Britain and Germany’, American Journal of
Sociology, 105 (1999), 652–96; Lise Togeby, ‘It Depends y How Organizational Participation Affects
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sources of such differences – if they in fact exist – and whether they are due to individuals’
status as citizens, their formative experiences or something else entirely.
Below, we address these issues by examining political participation in Europe: we focus
on differences between citizens and non-citizens, and between foreign-born and native-
born individuals. We argue that citizenship is a resource that enables immigrant political
engagement, but that its power to shape political engagement varies systematically across
individuals and types of participation. In particular, we expect citizenship to foster
political engagement among immigrants whose socialization experiences in their country
of origin would normally depress participation and for political actions that are more
costly. Thus, understanding patterns of immigrant political action and the role citizenship
can play in shaping these requires that we take into account the interplay of citizenship,
immigrant socialization experiences and the nature of political actions. We test these
arguments using the European Social Survey (ESS) data collected in nineteen European
countries in 2002–03.
This article seeks to make several contributions to research on immigrant political
participation and political incorporation. First, given that the quality of democratic life
across Europe will increasingly depend on whether people have opportunities to express
their grievances peacefully, contribute to collective policy deliberation and develop a
stake in the political system, our research redirects attention away from natives and policy
makers towards immigrants themselves. Secondly, on a theoretical level, we highlight the
critical, but complex, role that citizenship plays in shaping immigrant participation and
the variable effects it can have among different kinds of individuals and on different types
of participation. Thirdly, by distinguishing theoretically and empirically between the
effects of citizenship and of being foreign-born, we develop a more nuanced understanding of
the interplay between socialization experiences and citizenship status in forming the patterns
of political engagement among migrants. Finally, our analysis breaks new empirical ground
by going beyond the single most heavily studied case of immigrant participation – the United
States – a country that in many ways is an unusual case. Instead, we test existing arguments
against a varied and extensive sample of European nations with diverse groups of foreign-
born residents.
We proceed as follows: the next three sections present and elaborate our argument. We
then describe our data and measures, present our results and conclude by offering
suggestions for further research.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRANT POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: PRIOR STUDIES
Although European countries have long experienced signiﬁcant migration, we know little
about its consequences for countries’ patterns of civic life. In good part, this is because
research on immigrant political participation has focused on immigrants’ voting
behaviour (usually turnout or registration). To be sure, voting is a key consideration
when it comes to the demand side of democratic politics, but the focus on voting has
meant that scholars have paid limited attention to the role of citizenship: after all, since
non-citizens do not have the right to vote in national elections, they are typically excluded
(F’note continued)
Political Participation and Social Trust Among Second-Generation Immigrants in Denmark’, Journal of
Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30 (2004), 509–28. Comparative research based on systematic empirical
analyses of data from a large number of countries, however, remains very limited.
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from the growing number of studies on immigrant electoral participation.7 This creates a
disconnect between debates about citizenship laws, which revolve around the question of
immigrant incorporation and integration, and empirical studies whose focus on electoral
participation fails to capture the full range of participation by all immigrants.
The predominant focus on electoral participation is not surprising, considering that most
studies of immigrant participation have concentrated on the United States, a country where
native-born persons acquire citizenship at birth and foreign-born individuals usually arrive as
non-citizens.8 But this has meant that most studies of immigrant political participation have
examined a single case with a particular citizenship regime and, we would argue, an unusual
history of migration among the advanced industrialized democracies. Conversely, the
histories of immigration and citizenship policies across Europe vary quite distinctly, with
some countries more heavily inﬂuenced by their colonial past and history of democratization,
while others are more dependent on recent economic changes.9
As a result of the focus on the US case, scholars have centred their attention mainly on
differences in electoral participation between native-born and foreign-born citizens, while,
by design or perhaps unwittingly, ignoring the distinction between foreign-born citizens
and foreign-born non-citizens, or excluding non-citizens altogether.10 Focusing on the
7 See, e.g, Carol A. Cassel, ‘Hispanic Turnout: Estimates from Validated Voting Data’, Political
Research Quarterly, 55 (2002), 391–408; Wendy K.T. Cho, ‘Naturalization, Socialization, Participation:
Immigrants and Non(Voting)’, Journal of Politics, 61 (1999), 1140–55; Wendy K.T. Cho, James
G. Gimpel and Joshua J. Dyck, ‘Residential Concentration, Political Socialization, and Voter Turnout’,
Journal of Politics, 68 (2006), 156–67; Wendy K.T. Cho, James G. Gimpel and Tony Wu, ‘Clarifying the
Role of SES in Political Participation: Policy Threat and Arab American Mobilization’, Journal of
Politics, 68 (2006), 977–91; Loretta E. Bass and Lynne M. Casper, ‘Impacting the Political Landscape:
Who Registers and Votes among Naturalized Americans?’ Political Behavior, 23 (2001), 103–30; Louis
DeSipio, ‘Making Citizens or Good Citizens? Naturalization as a Predictor of Organizational and
Electoral Behavior among Latino Immigrants’, Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 18 (1996),
194–213; John R. Arvizu and Chris Garcia, ‘Latino Voting Participation: Explaining and Differentiating
Latino Voting Turnout’, Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 18 (1996), 104–28; James G. Gimpel,
Wendy K. Tam Cho, and Tony Wu, ‘Spatial Dimensions of Arab American Voter Mobilization After
September 11’, Political Geography, 26 (2007), 330–51; Benjamin Highton and Arthur L. Burris, ‘New
Perspectives on Latino Voter Turnout in the United States’, American Politics Research, 30 (2002),
285–306; Robert A. Jackson, ‘Differential Inﬂuences on Latino Electoral Participation’, Political
Behavior, 25 (2003), 339–66; Martin Johnson, Robert M. Stein and Robert Wrinkle, ‘Language Choice,
Residential Stability, and Voting among Latino Americans’, Social Science Quarterly, 84 (2003), 412–24;
Adrian D. Pantoja, Ricardo Ramirez and Garry M. Segura, ‘Citizens by Choice, Voters by Necessity:
Patterns in Political Mobilization by Naturalized Latinos’, Political Research Quarterly, 54 (2001),
729–50; Karthick S. Ramakrishnan and Thomas J. Espenshade, ‘Immigrant Incorporation and Political
Participation in the United States’, International Migration Review, 35 (2001), 870–909; Catherine
Simpson Bueker, ‘Political Incorporation Among Immigrants from Ten Areas of Origin: The Persistence
of Source Country Effects’, International Migration Review, 39 (2005), 103–40.
8 Unless they were born to American parents on American territory abroad (e.g., military bases,
embassies, and the like).
9 Patrick Weil, ‘Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty Five Nationality Laws’, in
T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer, eds, Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and
Practices (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.), 17–35; Marc Morje´ Howard,
The Politics of Citizenship in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Rogers Brubaker,
Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).
10 This is the case even in studies that examine a broader range of political activities (see Jane Junn,
‘Participation in Liberal Democracy: The Political Assimilation of Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities in
the United States’, American Behavioral Scientist, 42 (1999), 1417–38). Jan E. Leighley and Arnold Vedlitz
(‘Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations’, Journal
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behaviour of naturalized citizens can produce empirical and theoretical ambiguities
regarding the consequences of citizenship, however. An example of the confusion that can
arise from conﬂating citizenship status and nativity can be found in a paper by Louis
DeSipio,11 which argues that the process of naturalization in the United States should
encourage people to behave as good citizens. Here, citizenship acquisition is understood
not merely as a change in legal status but also a process of mandatory socialization and
learning. To test this idea, DeSipio focused on the differences in the political behaviour of
naturalized and native-born citizens, while excluding all foreign-born non-citizens from
the analysis. Although DeSipio expected the experience of naturalization to contribute
positively to political participation, he found just the opposite – namely, that naturalized
citizens actually participated less than native-born citizens.
This result, however, is not surprising in the light of other studies, which consistently reveal
that foreign-born individuals participate at lower rates than native-born ones.12 In fact, a
number of reasons may explain the failure to detect the hypothesized effect of citizenship on
political participation, but perhaps chief among them is the exclusion of non-citizens from the
analyses, thereby precluding the possibility of empirically distinguishing between the impact of
being foreign-born and that of naturalization/citizenship.13 For example, if foreign-born status
has a more powerful (and perhaps negative) impact on political engagement than the expected
positive effect of citizenship, then it would not be surprising that their combined effect –
captured by a single variable (foreign-born citizens), rather than two – turns out to be negative.
(F’note continued)
of Politics, 61 (1999), 1092–114) acknowledge the importance of citizenship, but also rely on native-born
status as a proxy for citizenship, thus similarly leaving aside the fact that some foreign-born individuals
are citizens.
11 DeSipio, ‘Making Citizens or Good Citizens?’ We do not mean to single out this particular study.
Instead, we use it to illustrate a larger point. It has been similarly suggested that citizenship acquisition in
Canada should have a ‘politicizing’ effect on political participation (see Jerome H. Black, ‘Immigrant
Political Adaptation in Canada: Some Tentative Findings’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 15
(1982), 3–27), and this expectation is consistent with research showing that citizenship has a positive
impact on partisanship acquisition (see Janelle S. Wong, ‘The Effects of Age and Political Exposure on
the Development of Party Identiﬁcation among Asian American and Latino Immigrants in the United
States’, Political Behavior, 22 (2000), 341–71; Bruce E. Cain, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Carole J. Uhlaner,
‘The Acquisition of Partisanship by Latinos and Asian Americans’, American Journal of Political Science,
35(1991), 390–422).
12 Junn, ‘Participation in Liberal Democracy’; Cho, ‘Naturalization, Socialization, Participation:
Immigrants and Non(Voting)’; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, ‘Immigrant Incorporation and Political
Participation in the United States’, p. 888.
13 According to prevailing theorizing and evidence, this result is rooted in a lack of familiarity with the
political system among individuals socialized in a different country and more shallow attachments to local
community, associations and political parties. Moreover, foreign-born individuals usually have fewer
emotional and material stakes in existing group tensions that express themselves in politics in their new home
country. And there are practical reasons for the lower involvement of the foreign-born as well, as they are
often preoccupied with settling into the new country and have less time for political involvement. Some
assume that foreigners are less politically involved because they are more orientated towards politics in their
homeland than are other immigrants. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that ties to a home country do
not matter as much for political participation as attachment to the host country (Pei-te Lien, ‘Ethnicity and
Political Participation: A Comparison between Asian and Mexican Americans’, Political Behavior, 16 (1994),
237–64). Moreover, others demonstrate that Mexican immigrants in the United States who send money
home are actually more politically involved in US politics than those who do not (Matt A. Barreto and Jose´
A. Mun˜oz, ‘Reexamining the ‘‘Politics of In-Between’’: Political Participation Among Mexican Immigrants
in the United States’, Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 25 (2003), 427–47).
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Speaking more generally, existing studies are ambiguous about the role that citizenship
can be expected to play in shaping political engagement among foreign-born individuals,
and no existing studies differentiate among all the different categories of citizens/non-
citizens and native/foreign-born individuals.14
CONCEPTUALIZING THE INFLUENCE OF CITIZENSHIP ON POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION
Aside from the ambiguity that arises from conﬂating citizenship and native-born status,
research into the connection between citizenship and political participation has occasionally
conﬂated the two through the use of participation as an indicator of active – that is, ‘virtuous’
or ‘effective’ – citizenship.15 Blurring the distinction between citizenship as a legal category and
as a set of behaviours is problematic, because citizenship provides people with opportunities to
participate, but it does not guarantee that they will actually take advantage of these.16
To cut through these empirical and conceptual ambiguities, we start by conceptualizing
citizenship as legal status.17 Based on the well-documented premise that participation
requires resources, we treat the legal status of citizenship as a resource that facilitates
political engagement. Citizenship contains instrumental and psychological dimensions.18
Instrumentally speaking, the state has always regulated political activity by deﬁning
which forms of participation are legal and who has the right to participate in them. The
key ways in which it has done so is by deﬁning membership in the political community
through citizenship that gives individuals certain rights and protections not shared by
non-citizens.19 Thus, citizenship is a resource provided by the state, and one that has the
capacity to lower the legal risks and the potential costs of participation.
Most obviously, citizenship provides an admission ticket for voting.20 The right to cast
a ballot in elections should for obvious legal reasons be an overwhelmingly powerful
marker between voters and non-voters (the cost of voting legally is much lower than the
14 While studies conducted in the United States and Denmark suggest that foreign-born citizens and
non-citizens engage in a variety of political acts, the evidence is equivocal with regard to whether they do
so at similar or different rates when immigrant experiences and socio-economic differences are accounted
for. See Barreto and Mun˜oz, ‘Reexamining the ‘‘Politics of In-Between’’ ’; Togeby, ‘It Depends y
Immigrants in Denmark’, Lien, ‘Ethnicity and Political Participation’; David Leal, ‘Political Participation
by Latino Non-Citizens in the United States’, British Journal of Political Science, 32 (2002), 353–70.
15 See, for instance, Jan W. Deth, Jose´ Ramo´n Montero and Anders Westholm, eds, Citizenship and
Involvement in European Democracies: A Comparative Analysis (London: Routledge, 2007); Charles
Pattie, Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley, Citizenship in Britain: Values, Participation and Democracy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Irene Bloemraad, Anna Korteweg and Go¨kc¸e Yurdakul,
‘Citizenship and Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State’,
Annual Review of Sociology, 34 (2008), 153–79.
16 Anders Westholm, Jose´ Ramo´n Montero and Jan W. van Deth, ‘Introduction: Citizenship,
Involvement, and Democracy in Europe’, in van Deth, Montero and Westholm, eds, Citizenship and
Involvement in European Democracies, pp. 1–32, at p. 3.
17 Thomas L. Dynneson, Civism: Cultivating Citizenship in European History (New York: Peter Lang,
2001).
18 Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul, ‘Citizenship and Immigration’.
19 Seyla Benhabib, ‘Political Theory and Political Membership in a Changing World’, in Ira
Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds, Political Science: State of the Discipline (New York: W. W. Norton
& Co., 2002), 404–32.
20 In most countries, only citizens are eligible to vote. Citizens of EU member states have the right to
vote in and stand for local elections in other EU member states if they reside there. However, this right is
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cost of trying to vote illegally). However, citizenship’s inﬂuence as a resource can be
expected to go beyond the ballot box since it provides a number of other rights and
protections that may be particularly inﬂuential in shaping non-electoral political action.
Speciﬁcally, the costs of participation can vary considerably for citizens and non-citizens.
While citizens might be ﬁned for participating in an illegal protest, individuals lacking
citizenship status might be deported or lose the chance ever to naturalize since many
countries bar the criminally convicted from becoming citizens.21
Beyond its instrumental value, citizenship is also likely to provide a psychological boost
to political engagement resulting from its role as a social identity. Speaking generally,
citizenship deﬁnes who is and who is not a full member of the political community. We
posit that the identity effects of citizenship may be particularly pronounced among
immigrants because they acquire citizenship through a process of naturalization that
requires learning about the rights and responsibilities of citizenship and professing loyalty
to the democratic order of a country. As such, citizenship can also be conceptualized in
psychological terms as a resource that encourages people to internalize the democratic
ideals of active citizenship and, in doing so, makes cognitive engagement with politics less
costly.22
Thus, if citizenship is more than a legal entitlement to vote and functions as a resource
that helps individuals to offset the costs of participation, we would expect citizens to
engage in non-electoral forms of political action at higher rates than non-citizens, and
foreign-born citizens (rather than merely residents) to participate as much as native-born
citizens.23 This implies that the inﬂuence of citizenship on political engagement is broader
(F’note continued)
not conferred to non-EU citizens (also referred to as third-country nationals), nor does it apply to
national elections.
21 Lisa Martinez (‘Yes We Can: Latino Participation in Unconventional Politics’, Social Forces, 84
(2005), 135–55, p. 144) ﬁnds that citizenship has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact on Latino
protest behaviour in the United States and suggests that non-citizens might associate protesting with
higher costs, such as fear of deportation or imprisonment. Her models, and models reported in other
studies, however, fail to control for a number of immigrant-speciﬁc variables, such as the amount of time
foreign-born respondents have spent in the United States. These variables, as we show below, have
important consequences for the impact of citizenship on non-electoral participation.
22 Non-citizens may occasionally have important grounds to be politically involved in their host
country. After all, regardless of their legal status, they are affected by their host country’s domestic
policies, not the least of which is anti-immigrant legislation (Barreto and Mun˜oz, ‘Reexamining the
‘‘Politics of In-Between’’ ’). Research also shows that non-citizens are often concerned with their host
country’s foreign policies towards their country of origin, thus motivating their political engagement
(Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Harry Pachon, Latinos and US Foreign Policy: Representing the
‘‘Homeland’’? (Lanham: Rowman & Littleﬁeld, 2000)). Since non-citizens are barred from expressing
themselves in national elections, non-electoral participation may be an important channel for
communicating their demands to policy makers. However, we do not believe that such occasional
motivations on average outweigh the more systematic effects of citizenship we posit.
23 As a consequence of the expected higher rate of participation by citizens, citizenship should also be
associated with higher levels of civic skills acquired through the exercise of obligations and
responsibilities, which are thought to contribute positively to people’s civic orientations and political
engagement through a process of socialization, education and interaction with government authorities
(Pamela Johnston Conover, Ivor M. Crewe and Donald D. Searing, ‘The Nature of Citizenship and Great
Britain: Empirical Comments on Theoretical Themes’, Journal of Politics, 53 (1991), 800–32; Pamela
Johnston Conover, Donald D. Searing and Ivor Crewe, ‘The Elusive Ideal of Equal Citizenship: Political
Theory and Political Psychology in the United States and Great Britain’, Journal of Politics, 66 (2004),
1036–68; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, Citizenship in Britain).
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than existing studies of immigrant electoral behaviour surmise and contributes positively
to forms of participation that do not require formal membership in a nation state.
CITIZENSHIP, SOCIALIZATION AND THE VARIETIES OF POLITICAL ACTION
When considering the impact of citizenship as a resource on participation among
immigrants, the question arises as to whether this presumed effect is uniform or whether it
can be expected to vary across different types of political acts or individuals. We argue that it
is unlikely that citizenship has a ‘one size ﬁts all’ effect. Speciﬁcally, we posit that the resource
of citizenship should be particularly potent in mobilizing more costly political acts and
among individuals whose socialization experiences are inauspicious for political engagement.
Citizenship and Varieties of Participation
Given the variable costs associated with different political acts, we expect citizenship to
facilitate immigrant engagement in more costly forms of participation. One way to identify
such acts is to take a broad view of political engagement and to differentiate between those
that are less costly because they are formalized, routinized and have a developed mobilization
‘infrastructure’ and those that are not. This distinction maps onto the empirical and theoretical
categorization of political acts into conventional, institutionalized political acts (mostly)
orientated towards electoral processes24 and unconventional, uninstitutionalized forms of
participation that take place outside of electoral politics and often involve more spontaneous,
episodic and disruptive political acts.25 Because uninstitutionalized acts, by deﬁnition, are less
formalized and routinized, often require more effort and co-operation, and run the risk of
being less socially acceptable, they are more costly than institutionalized activities. As a result,
if citizenship is a resource for political mobilization, we expect it to be a more powerful catalyst
in shaping uninstitutionalized political acts than conventional activities.
Citizenship and Varieties of Socialization Experiences
The difﬁculty of specifying the effects of citizenship on political participation among foreign-
born individuals empirically lies partially in the complex task of disentangling the effects of
citizenship from the effects of being a foreigner – that is, people’s socialization experiences. At
the level of individuals, this comes down to differentiating between citizenship on one hand
and place of birth on the other. The conceptual distinction between nativity and citizenship
status suggests a fourfold typology among a country’s residents: (1) native-born citizens
(the largest share of population in most countries), (2) native-born non-citizens (present in
countries without jus soli), (3) foreign-born citizens (who can be either naturalized residents
or foreign-born offspring of citizens) and (4) foreign-born non-citizens. This distinction is
important for empirical reasons as well because it raises the question of whether citizenship
24 Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase with Klaus Allerbeck, Barbara Farah, Felix Heunks, Ronald
Inglehart, M. Kent Jennings, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Alan Marsh and Leopold Rosenmayr, Political
Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979); Edward
N. Muller, ‘A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence’, American Political Science
Review, 66 (1972), 928–59.
25 Max Kaase, ‘Mass Participation’, in M. Kent Jennings and Jan W. van Deth with Samuel Barnes,
Dieter Fuchs, Felix Heunks, Ronald Inglehart, Max Kaase, Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Jacques
Thomassen, eds, Continuities in Political Action: A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in Three
Western Democracies (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1989), pp. 23–64.
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(or the lack thereof) exerts an effect on participation patterns once we have accounted more
fully for what it means to be a foreigner. Below we focus on a factor that has been identiﬁed
as a likely source of differences in the patterns of political engagement among the foreign-
born: socialization experiences in the country of origin.
Regardless of whether one has become a citizen, being an immigrant means having been
born into and having lived in a different political environment. These experiences are
bound to leave a mark, and researchers have sought to trace how much and what kind of
an impact they leave. Studies have shown that standard explanations, such as the socio-
economic model of political participation, are helpful but insufﬁcient for understanding
why immigrants engage in politics. In particular, since foreigners are socialized in a
political system that is different from the one they currently inhabit, explaining their
participation patterns more fully requires accounting for these experiences.26
A critical factor shaping the experiences of foreign-born individuals prior to their
arrival has long been thought to be the level of democracy in the country of origin. Less
democratic regimes are usually associated with less exposure to democratic norms, a
weaker sense of civic responsibility, and fewer skills and less knowledge necessary for
political engagement in liberal democracies.27 Moreover, scholars tend to assume that
arrivals from less democratic countries typically have lower levels of political trust due to
their previous experiences with state-sponsored oppression.28 Conversely, previous
exposure to democratic governance is expected to facilitate immigrant adaptation and
their political integration into a democratic host country.29 Thus, because the skills and
knowledge necessary for political involvement learned from an early age in full-ﬂedged
democracies are likely to be systematic factors shaping participation, we hypothesize that
immigrants from more democratic countries face a lower hurdle of political involvement
than immigrants from less democratic ones.30
26 Karthick S. Ramakrishnan, Democracy in Immigrant America: Changing Demographics and Political
Participation (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005); Cho, Gimpel and Wu, ‘Clarifying the
Role of SES in Political Participation’.
27 Stephen White, Neil Nevitte, Andre´ Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil and Patrick Fournier, ‘The Political
Resocialization of Immigrants’, Political Research Quarterly, 61 (2008), 268–81; Jerome H. Black,
Richard Niemi and Bingham G. Powell, ‘Age and Resistance to Political Learning in a New Environment:
The Case of Canadian Immigrants’, Comparative Politics, 20 (1987), 73–84; Ramakrishnan, Democracy in
Immigrant America, p. 91.
28 John Harles, Politics in the Lifeboat: Immigrants and the American Democratic Order (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview, 1993); Alejandro Portes and Rube´n G. Rumbaut, Immigrant America: A Portrait (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1996); Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie, ‘Political Participation and Political
Trust in Amsterdam: Civic Communities and Ethnic Networks’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 25
(1999), 703–26; Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1951).
29 Jerome H. Black, ‘The Practice of Politics in Two Settings: Political Transferability Among Recent
Immigrants to Canada’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 20 (1987), 731–53; Black, Niemi and
Powell, ‘Age and Resistance to Political Learning in a New Environment’; Ada Finifter and Bernard
Finifter, ‘Party Identiﬁcation and Political Adaptation of American Migrants in Australia’, Journal of
Politics, 51 (1989), 599–630; Bueker, ‘Political Incorporation among Immigrants from Ten Areas of
Origin’; Paul Wilson, Immigrants and Politics (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973).
30 Occasionally, researchers have suggested that those raised in undemocratic environments may in fact
be more politically involved in the receiving (democratic) country because they have a greater
appreciation for democratic rights and opportunities to inﬂuence politics. For example, some point to the
fact that Cuban Americans participate at higher rates than other Latino immigrants (Alejandro Portes
and Rafael Mozo, ‘The Political Adaptation Process of Cubans and Other Ethnic Minorities in the
United States: A Preliminary Analysis’, International Migration Review, 19 (1985), 35–63; Arvizu and
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An important question in the context of our hypothesized effect of democratic
socialization experiences is whether citizenship is an equally valuable resource among
individuals with differential predispositions to participate in politics because of
experiences in their countries of origin. We posit that such a resource is likely to be
particularly useful for individuals who are less inclined to engage in politics in the ﬁrst
place. That is, viewed from the perspective of citizenship as a resource discussed above, we
posit that the two – citizenship and socialization – interact, such that citizenship serves
to moderate the impact of socialization experiences on engagement. Speciﬁcally, given
the hurdle that socialization experiences in autocratic societies pose to democratic
engagement, citizenship should help to offset the negative impact that growing up under
an autocratic regime may have on participation.
DATA AND MEASURES
The individual-level data analysed below come from the European Social Survey (ESS)
conducted in 2002–03. The ESS is a biennial academically-driven social survey that has
been conducted since 2002 and now covers more than thirty countries. Funded by the
European Commission, the European Science Foundation and academic funding bodies
in each participating country, the project is known for its high standards of
methodological rigour in survey design and data collection.31 Hour-long face-to-face
interviews are carefully designed for optimal comparability of survey questions across
countries following rigorous translation protocols and pre-testing. To ensure high
representativeness of national populations, the survey relies on strict random probability
sampling that is based on full coverage of the eligible residential populations of 15 years
old or older who are resident within private households, regardless of nationality,
citizenship, language or legal status. The target minimum response rate is 70 per cent, and
minimum effective sample sizes (completely responded units) are 1,500 or 800 where the
(F’note continued)
Garcia, ‘Latino Voting Participation’; DeSipio, ‘Making Citizens or Good Citizens?’), or the behaviour of
East Europeans who came to the United States and Canada during the Cold War (Andrew M. Greeley,
Ethnicity in the United States: A Preliminary Reconnaissance (New York: Wiley, 1974); Black, ‘The
Practice of Politics in Two Settings’). These contrasting perspectives may not be incompatible if the
majority of immigrants from less democratic countries are political refugees. Having migrated for political
reasons, refugees may possess a keener sense how politics impacts their daily lives (Ramakrishnan,
Democracy in Immigrant America: Changing Demographics and Political Participation, p. 88; Portes and
Mozo, ‘The Political Adaptation Process of Cubans and Other Ethnic Minorities in the United States’).
Moreover, some argue that those who qualify for refugee assistance from government may develop
greater skills and experience from interacting with government agencies and a greater stake in domestic
politics as it relates to their continued receipt of such beneﬁts (Ramakrishnan, Democracy in Immigrant
America, p. 88). Yet others insist that even individuals who migrate from less to more democratic
countries primarily for economic reasons might have an appreciation of democracy. For instance, Barreto
and Mun˜oz (‘Reexamining the ‘‘Politics of In-Between’’ ’, p. 432) claim that Mexicans who arrived in the
United States in the 1980s and 1990s were escaping not only a depressed economy but also a polity in
which one-party rule had been the norm for 70 years (see also Douglas S. Massey, ‘Why Does
Immigration Occur? A Theoretical Synthesis’, in Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz and Josh DeWind,
eds, The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience (New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 1999), pp. 34–52.
31 Miki Caul Kittilson, ‘Research Resources in Comparative Political Behavior’, in Russell J. Dalton
and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), pp. 865–99.
490 JUST AND ANDERSON
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123411000378
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 02 Feb 2017 at 12:01:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
total population is smaller than 2 million inhabitants.32 Since we are particularly
interested in foreign-born respondents who constitute a minority of those surveyed and
because a portion of our analyses focuses on foreign-born respondents only, we sought to
verify that our samples of foreigners from different countries closely match the
characteristics of the populations under investigation.
We did so by conducting two additional analyses. First, we calculated the percentages
of foreign-born respondents in the ESS sample and compared these to data measuring the
actual percentages of foreign-born individuals collected by the European Union’s
statistical agency, Eurostat. The Pearson correlation between the percentages of foreign-
born individuals in the surveys and foreign-born residents according to Eurostat census
ﬁgures in the countries included in our study was 0.98, indicating an extremely close ﬁt
between survey and ofﬁcial statistics. Secondly, using a question about respondents’
country of origin, we investigated the extent to which our samples of foreign-born
respondents were representative of populations in the countries under investigation by
calculating the percentages of individuals from different regions of the world.33 The
Pearson correlation between the percentages of foreign-born individuals in our surveys
from speciﬁc regions and the Eurostat data on foreign-born residents in the countries
from these regions was 0.90, indicating yet again a very close ﬁt between survey and
ofﬁcial statistics.
In addition to providing high-quality data, the ESS is among the very few cross-
national data collection efforts that sample non-citizens and ask questions related to
people’s citizenship, country of origin and length of stay in the receiving country
alongside standard questions about political participation (it is also the only set of surveys
that ask these questions in identical format across a range of countries). The relevant
survey items and macro-level variables were available for nineteen European countries:34
Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom.35
Dependent Variables
Our dependent variables are designed to measure non-electoral political engagement in
several ways to account for the varieties of actions people engage in but also for the fact
that the frequency with which people engage in any one act is relatively low. First, we
constructed an additive index from the number of such activities respondents reported
having engaged in over the course of the last year: contacting politicians or government
ofﬁcials; working for a political party; action group or another organization; wearing or
32 Further information on the ESS methodology is available on the ESS website and from the
Norwegian Science Data Services (http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ and http://ess.nsd.uib.no/).
33 We differentiated individuals by the following regions of origin: Africa, Asia, the Balkans, East
Central Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, North America, Australia and New Zealand, and
Western Europe. For more details about individual countries, please contact the authors.
34 Pooling data across countries is particularly useful for the purpose of our analyses because the
number of foreign-born respondents in any one national survey is relatively small, making it difﬁcult to
estimate multivariate models of participation with much precision.
35 We dropped Poland and Hungary from the sample because they lacked variation on the citizenship
variable: in Poland, all respondents were coded as citizens; in Hungary, there were only three (native-
born) non-citizens.
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displaying a campaign badge or sticker; signing a petition; boycotting or buying products
for political; ethical or environmental reasons; donating money to political organizations;
and participating in lawful demonstrations and illegal protest activities. This measure
captures (non-electoral) political engagement in a very broad way; it allows individuals to
choose their preferred form of participation and provides us with a wide variety of
political acts that individuals can choose to engage in. The index ranges from 0 to 10, with
higher values indicating more political action.36
Since we hypothesize that the impact of citizenship will vary across types of political
engagement, we also follow the extant literature and separate the overall index of
participatory acts into institutionalized and uninstitutionalized forms of political
engagement.37 Institutionalized participation in politics is an additive index of the
following ﬁve activities respondents reported having engaged in: contacting a politician or
a government or local government ofﬁcial; working in a political party or action group;
working in another organization or association; wearing or displaying a campaign badge
or sticker; and donating money to political organizations. Uninstitutionalized participation is
based on the following ﬁve activities: signing a petition; boycotting or buying products for
political, ethical or environmental reasons; and participating in lawful demonstrations or
illegal protest activities. Both measures of participation range from 0 to 5, with higher values
indicating higher levels of political engagement.
Consistent with prior research, we ﬁnd that overall levels of participation are quite low; the
mean score on the political action index is 1.36 (on a 0–10 scale). Thus, individuals on average
engage in (slightly more than) one kind of political activity. Looking at the underlying
distribution of reported acts, about 44 per cent of respondents said that they had engaged in
none of the activities, and another 34 per cent had been involved in only one or two, with the
remaining 22 per cent of respondents engaging in more than two activities.
Independent Variables
Our key independent variables – citizenship and foreign-born status – are derived from
two survey questions: ‘Are you a citizen of this country?’ and ‘Were you born in this
country?’ Using responses to these questions, we created four dichotomous variables that
classiﬁed respondents as foreign-born citizens, foreign-born non-citizens, native-born
citizens and native-born non-citizens. Pooling the data across countries generates a
sample of 3,174 foreign-born respondents, 1,752 of whom (55.27 per cent) are foreign-
born citizens and 1,418 (44.73 per cent) foreign-born non-citizens.38
To capture immigrant socialization experiences, we rely on two variables: level of democracy
in the respondent’s country of origin and an individual’s duration of stay in the host country.
Virtually all prior studies have measured democratic origin by categorizing respondents with
regard to whether they come from a democratic or undemocratic country. Such a simple
categorization misses considerable variation in immigrants’ political experiences, and it
36 Considering the diversity of countries and participatory acts, these items scale quite well, with a
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.69 among all respondents and 0.73 among foreigners (for details on question
wording and variable coding, see Appendix).
37 We follow the distinction made by Barnes and Kaase (Political Action); see also Russell J. Dalton,
Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 4th edn
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006).
38 Because native-born non-citizens constituted only a very small number of cases (206), we dropped
them from the analysis for statistical reasons.
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confounds a number of factors that may be associated with a country’s level of democracy. To
overcome these shortcomings and provide a more ﬁne-tuned indicator of democratic
socialization, we measure democracy in the country of origin with the help of three survey
questions and a measure of democracy from the Polity IV dataset.39
To identify respondents’ country of origin, they were asked, ‘Were you born in this
country?’ If the answer was ‘No’, the follow up question was ‘In which country were you
born?’ To identify when respondents arrived in the host country, those who were born
abroad were asked, ‘How long ago did you ﬁrst come to live in this country?’ We then
matched information about the immigrant’s country of origin and the time of migration
with Polity IV data that measure the level of formal democracy (the extent to which
citizens can express preferences about alternative policies and leaders, constrain executive
power, and are guaranteed civil liberties in their daily lives) in the country of origin at the
time of their departure (see Appendix for further details). To facilitate interpretation of
the results, we rescaled the original polity variable so that the resulting variable of
democracy in the immigrant’s country of origin ranges from 0, indicating that someone
was socialized in a ‘strongly autocratic regime’, to 20, which indicates that someone came
from a ‘strongly democratic regime’.40
Control Variables
Our multivariate analyses include a range of control variables past research has identiﬁed
as consistent micro- and macro-determinants of political engagement: at the level of
individuals, we include a standard set of demographic variables (age, gender, marital status) as
well as indicators of people’s socio-economic resources and status (income, education and
employment). Moreover, we control for immigrant-speciﬁc experiences, such as how recently
a respondent had arrived in the host country and whether a respondent immigrated from a
member state of the European Union (EU). Finally, we include respondents’ religiosity and
religious denomination, as well as measures of social connectedness and residential stability.
At the macro-level, we take into account host countries’ political and economic characteristics,
such as a level of economic prosperity and growth, the extent of state intervention in the
economy, and a country’s experience with democratic governance. In addition, we control for
immigration-speciﬁc contextual characteristics, such as the size of the foreign-born population
and the country’s citizenship policy regime. Details on control variables and coding
procedures are listed in the Appendix.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
A ﬁrst look at the data reveals that, on average, citizens participate more in politics than
non-citizens: the mean values on the political action scale are 1.38 for citizens and 1.08 for
non-citizens. This difference applies to both institutionalized (citizens: 0.56; non-citizens:
0.37) and uninstitutionalized political acts (citizens: 0.82; non-citizens: 0.72). Moreover,
native-born citizens report roughly the same overall engagement in politics as foreign-born
citizens both overall (1.38 on the political action scale) and with regard to institutionalized
(native-born citizens: 0.56, foreign-born citizens: 0.53), and uninstitutionalized participation
(native-born citizens: 0.82, foreign-born citizens: 0.86).
39 Polity IV is a widely used dataset of regime characteristics that provides comparative data for
virtually all countries in the world on an annual basis between 1800 and 2007.
40 The original polity score ranges from 210 to 110.
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To isolate with greater statistical precision the relative effects that citizenship, immigrant
status and other factors have on patterns of participation, our analysis proceeds in three
steps. First, we establish a baseline for the impact of citizenship on participation across all
countries and all respondents. Comparing native-born and foreign-born respondents enables
us to see whether observed differences between these groups are due to citizenship or having
been born abroad. As a second step, we focus exclusively on foreign-born individuals to
examine whether citizenship exerts an independent effect on political action, and whether
it interacts with immigrant experiences in country of origin in shaping their political
engagement in their new homeland. Finally, to ensure that any differences in the levels of
political participation among foreign-born individuals are indeed due to citizenship status
rather than some unobserved heterogeneity that drives both citizenship acquisition and
political participation, we present two-stage instrumental variable estimations designed to
address the potential problem of omitted-variable bias.
Citizenship, Foreign Birth and Political Participation: Baseline Models
Because the analysis requires that we combine information collected at the level of
individuals and at the level of countries, the dataset has a multi-level structure (one level,
the individual, is nested within the other, the country). To avoid a number of statistical
problems associated with such a data structure (clustering, non-constant variance,
underestimation of standard errors, etc.),41 we estimated multi-level mixed-effects maximum
likelihood models with random intercepts (to allow for cross-country heterogeneity in levels
of participation), random slopes for our citizenship variables (to allow for cross-country
variability in the magnitude of citizenship coefﬁcients) and respondents clustered at the level
of countries.
To assess the impact of citizenship on participation across all countries and all
respondents in our base-line model, we included two dummy variables for foreign-born
citizens and foreign-born non-citizens, using native-born citizens as the comparison
group. The results, shown in Table 2, indicate that political engagement among foreign-born
individuals is systematically lower than among native-born citizens, and is particularly low for
TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics of Political Participation by Citizenship and Nativity







Variables Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Min Max
Political Action 1.38 1.71 1.38 1.81 1.08 1.58 0 10
Institutionalized Action 0.56 0.96 0.53 0.97 0.37 0.75 0 5
Un-institutionalized Action 0.82 1.09 0.86 1.16 0.72 1.08 0 5
Source: The European Social Society (ESS), 2002–2003.
41 Cf. Tom A. B. Snijders and Roel Bosker,Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced
Multilevel Modeling (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1999); for applications in political science, see Marco
R. Steenbergen and Bradford S. Jones, ‘Modeling Multilevel Data Structures’, American Journal of
Political Science, 46 (2002), 218–37.
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TABLE 2 Political Participation in Nineteen European Countries, 2002–03





Foreign-born citizen 2.266*** (.069) 2.074y (.039) 2.191*** (.039)
Foreign-born non-citizen 2.687*** (.101) 2.250*** (.051) 2.447*** (.064)
Discriminated against .665*** (.038) .298*** (.022) .371*** (.024)
Crime victim .365*** (.022) .147*** (.013) .217*** (.014)
Satisfaction with democracy 2.001 (.004) .003 (.002) 2.004y (.002)
Age .035*** (.003) .017*** (.002) .017*** (.002)
Age squared 2.000*** (.000) 2.000*** (.000) 2.000*** (.000)
Income .067*** (.013) .040*** (.007) .028*** (.008)
Education .264*** (.007) .112*** (.004) .152*** (.004)
Male .016 (.018) .137*** (.011) 2.116*** (.012)
Married .026 (.020) .056*** (.012) 2.030* (.013)
Unemployed 2.031 (.022) 2.013 (.013) 2.017 (.014)
Urban .014y (.008) 2.028*** (.005) .041*** (.005)
Residential stability 2.001 (.001) .001*** (.000) 2.002*** (.000)
Social connectedness .106*** (.006) .058*** (.004) .050*** (.004)
Religiosity .018*** (.004) .012*** (.002) .007** (.002)
Christian 2.087*** (.022) 2.009 (.013) 2.081*** (.014)
Muslim 2.228* (.090) 2.072 (.052) 2.149** (.057)
Other religions .312** (.102) .096 (.060) .220*** (.064)
Foreign-born from an EU country .407*** (.070) .063 (.040) .351*** (.044)
Foreign population size (%) .011 (.017) 2.006 (.007) .017 (.013)
Citizenship policies in host country .020 (.040) .006 (.016) .012 (.030)
New democracy 2.349 (.291) 2.037 (.113) 2.310 (.218)
GDP per capita (in 1,000 of $’s) .014 (.013) .010* (.005) .004 (.010)
Economic growth (%) 2.025 (.050) 2.007 (.019) 2.017 (.037)
Government expenditure (% of GDP) .010 (.022) 2.003 (.009) .013 (.016)
Constant 21.610*** (.493) 2.901*** (.195) 2.706y (.367)
Standard deviation of random slope: foreign-born citizen .207 (.061) .114 (.033) .103 (.039)
Standard deviation of random slope: foreign-born non-citizen .308 (.076) .137 (.045) .197 (.048)
Standard deviation of random intercept .281 (.047) .108 (.018) .211 (.035)
Standard deviation of residuals 1.571 (.006) .920 (.004) .992 (.004)
Number of observations 32,070 32,389 32,178
Number of groups 19 19 19
Wald X2 (df) 3,789.56(26)*** 2,209.01(26)*** 3,947.17(26)***
Note: Results are mixed-effects maximum likelihood estimates using STATA 11.0’s xtmixed command. Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors. yp, 0.1,
*p, 0.05, **p, 0.01, ***p, 0.001 (two-tailed). ‘Native-born citizens’ is the reference category for foreign-born citizens and foreign-born non-citizens;
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foreign-born non-citizens. This ﬁnding is consistent across different types of political action
and suggests that the key difference is between foreign-born non-citizens on the one hand and
citizens (both native and foreign-born) on the other.42
Our analysis so far shows that citizenship matters for political engagement when we
compare foreign-born citizens, foreign-born non-citizens and native-born citizens. This is
an important baseline for pursuing the question of whether citizenship matters. However,
statistically speaking, the estimates do not show conclusively whether participation rates
among foreign-born citizens and foreign-born non-citizens are signiﬁcantly different from
each other, nor do they shed any light on the question of whether citizenship continues to
have a positive impact on participation once we take into account immigrant experiences
and characteristics more fully.43 To do so, we turn to a more detailed analysis of foreign-
born individuals.
Citizenship and Immigrant Participation
To examine the effects of citizenship on political participation among ﬁrst-generation
immigrants, and to see whether citizenship is more than just a placeholder for other
individual differences, such as immigrant socialization experiences, we focus exclusively on
foreign-born respondents as a next step. We estimate models similar to those reported in
Table 2, with several additions: ﬁrst, we now include a measure of citizenship; secondly, we
control for the length of time respondents have lived in the country; thirdly, we include our
measure of democratic socialization in the country of origin; and, ﬁnally, we include an
interaction term of democratic socialization and citizenship to gauge the presumed
conditional effect of citizenship on participation among individuals raised in less
democratic environments. The results of these estimations are shown in Table 3.
They reveal that citizenship is positively related to political participation, but that its impact
should not be considered in isolation. First, citizenship is not the only determinant of
immigrant political action. Our results indicate that duration of stay in the receiving country
also powerfully shapes political participation among the foreign-born. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd
that more recent immigrants engage in fewer political acts than foreigners who arrived many
years ago. Thus, immigrants, regardless of citizenship, learn participation in the sense that
prolonged exposure to the host country steadily builds capacity for political engagement.
Secondly, our results show that the impact of citizenship on political participation is
conditioned by immigrant political socialization before arrival in the host country, and this is
especially true for less institutionalized political acts. We ﬁnd that the interaction term for
citizenship and the level of democracy in the country of origin is negative, indicating that the
positive effect of citizenship on political participation is systematically smaller among
individuals who grew up in democratic countries. This means that the added beneﬁt of
42 We sought to ensure the robustness of these inferences by examining whether our results were
sensitive to the inclusion of any particular country; this was not the case.
43 Variables such as discrimination and criminal victimization may capture some of these experiences if
they are more prevalent among immigrants than native-born individuals. Our data show that 15 per cent
of foreign-born individuals report being a member of a group that is being discriminated against, while
about 5 per cent of native-born individuals agree that this is the case. And about 21 per cent of native-
born respondents report being the victim of a crime within the past ﬁve years, while about 22 per cent of
foreign-born individuals say they have been the victim of a crime. Regardless of these statistics, because
immigrants and non-immigrants share these experiences, they do not serve to separate these groups
exclusively.
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TABLE 3 Political Participation among Foreign-Born Individuals in Nineteen European Countries, 2002–03
Independent variables Political action Institutionalized political action Uninstitutionalized political action
Citizen .433* (.170) .124 (.085) .312** (.116)
Democracy level in country of origin .010 (.009) 2.001 (.005) .010y (.006)
Citizen x Democracy in country of origin 2.018y (.010) 2.000 (.005) 2.017** (.006)
Recent immigrant 2.205*** (.038) 2.051* (.020) 2.153*** (.025)
Discriminated against .339*** (.091) .206*** (.049) .132* (.060)
Crime victim .410*** (.074) .130*** (.040) .273*** (.049)
Satisfaction with democracy 2.044*** (.014) 2.015* (.007) 2.030*** (.009)
Age .028* (.012) .010 (.006) .020** (.008)
Age squared 2.000** (.000) 2.000 (.000) 2.000*** (.000)
Income .083* (.041) .013 (.022) .068* (.027)
Education .240*** (.022) .101*** (.012) .142*** (.014)
Male 2.008 (.063) .066* (.034) 2.072y (.041)
Married 2.198** (.069) 2.060 (.037) 2.147*** (.045)
Unemployed .098 (.074) .033 (.040) .065 (.048)
Urban .056* (.028) .001 (.015) .051** (.018)
Residential stability .001 (.003) .002 (.002) 2.001 (.002)
Social connectedness .077*** (.021) .044*** (.011) .038** (.014)
Religiosity .004 (.012) .003 (.006) .001 (.008)
Christian 2.263*** (.076) 2.089* (.041) 2.187*** (.050)
Muslim 2.275* (.123) 2.117y (.066) 2.154y (.080)
Other religions 2.020 (.199) 2.030 (.107) .009 (.131)
Foreign-born from an EU country .288** (.102) .057 (.055) .236*** (.067)
Foreign population size (%) 2.043** (.015) 2.029*** (.007) 2.016 (.010)
Citizenship policies in host country .020 (.035) .009 (.016) .018 (.022)
New democracy 2.542y (.309) 2.082 (.127) 2.431* (.213)
GDP per capita (in 1,000 of $’s) .040*** (.011) .023*** (.005) .018** (.007)
Economic growth (%) 2.007 (.041) 2.009 (.018) 2.006 (.026)
Government expenditure (% of GDP) .005 (.019) 2.010 (.008) .009 (.012)
Constant 21.000y (.528) 2.383 (.259) 2.538 (.335)
Standard deviation of random slope: citizen .266 (.079) .061 (.050) .217 (.056)
Standard deviation of random intercept .150 (.062) .065 (.029) .081 (.049)
Standard deviation of residuals 1.553 (.022) .839 (.012) 1.020 (.014)
Number of observations 2,628 2,650 2,639
Number of groups 19 19 19
Wald X2 (df) 458.81(28)*** 255.42(28)*** 464.30(28)***
Note: Results are mixed-effects maximum likelihood estimates using STATA 11.0’s xtmixed command. Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors. yp, 0.1,
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citizenship is less valuable to individuals who hail from more democratic countries and more
valuable to those who grew up in undemocratic ones.44
Instrumental Variable Estimations of the Effects of Citizenship on Participation
While the results so far unanimously provide consistent evidence for our hypotheses, they are
not ironclad. One particular difﬁculty with assessing the impact of citizenship on political
participation is that people may self-select into the process of naturalization.45 By this we mean
that individuals who decide to seek citizenship may also be more motivated to participate in
politics compared to immigrants who choose not to naturalize. As a result, the positive impact
of citizenship on political participation could be spurious and instead result from some other
characteristics – such as intrinsic individual motivations to engage in politics – that operate
on both naturalization and political participation, rather than from citizenship per se.
There are two ways of addressing this possibility. First, to guard against spurious
inferences in a traditional regression setup, it is important to control for important
potentially confounding factors. This is a strategy we pursued in the estimations reported
in Table 3. As the results showed, controlling for a host of attitudinal and demographic
characteristics of individuals as well as the country-context in which they are located did
not render the coefﬁcients for citizenship insigniﬁcant.
As a second estimation strategy, we re-examined our models with the help of a two-stage
instrumental variable (IV) approach. This approach can be used for a number of different
reasons, but is employed here speciﬁcally because of its demonstrated ability to address the
potential problem of omitting an unobserved but relevant explanatory variable.46 Ignoring
such a variable produces biased and inconsistent estimates; fortunately, these can be corrected
44 When we compare the impact of traditional explanations of political participation (socio-economic
characteristics and civic attitudes) vis-a`-vis more immigrant-speciﬁc variables, we ﬁnd that the power of
traditional explanations is not diminished by accounting for immigrants’ experiences. This demonstrates
that understanding the immigrant experience complements rather than replaces existing explanations of
political action. Interestingly, the ease with which citizens are able to acquire citizenship, as measured by
the citizenship policy index, does not affect immigrants’ political engagement.
45 Highton and Burris, ‘New Perspectives on Latino Voter Turnout in the United States’, p. 290; Zai
Liang, ‘Social Contact, Social Capital and the Naturalization Process: Evidence from Six Immigrant
Groups’, Social Science Research, 23 (1994), 407–37; see P. Lim, Colleen Barry-Goodman and David
Branham, ‘Discrimination that Travels: How Ethnicity Affects Party Identiﬁcation for Southeast Asian
Immigrants’, Social Science Quarterly, 87 (2006), 1158–70; Carole J. Uhlaner, Bruce E. Cain and
D. Roderick Kiewiet, ‘Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s’, Political Behavior, 11
(1989), 195–231, p. 212; Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura, ‘Citizens by Choice, Voters by Necessity’, p. 735;
Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, ‘Immigrant Incorporation and Political Participation in the United
States’, p. 876. This perspective is consistent with previous research that employed citizenship as a proxy
for commitment to host country (Black, ‘The Practice of Politics in Two Settings’; Black, Niemi and
Powell, ‘Age and Resistance to Political Learning in a New Environment’).
46 Christopher F. Baum, An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata (College Station, Tex.:
Stata Press, 2006), chap. 8. Although it may seem at ﬁrst glance that we have a case for a selection model,
our theoretical model and data are not amenable to such statistical techniques. Speciﬁcally, a Heckman
selection model operates on the assumption that only those who select themselves into a particular
condition (e.g. citizenship) in the ﬁrst stage have variation on the dependent variable in the second stage
(e.g. political participation). The problem in the context of this study of political participation is that this
assumption is applicable only to those forms of behaviour that are restricted to citizens (such as voting in
national elections). This is not the case with non-electoral participation that is available to both citizens
and non-citizens, and which is the focus of our analysis. Therefore, a Heckman selection model (or related
approaches) is not applicable here.
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using the IV approach, assuming that valid instruments can be identiﬁed.47 Substantively,
this will allow us to avoid the possible entanglement of our independent and dependent
variables due to the potential selection of individuals with particular characteristics into
acquiring citizenship.
We argue that geographic distance between an immigrant’s country of origin and the
new homeland as well as familial ties to the host country can be used as such instruments.
Naturalization studies suggest that geographic distance between sending and receiving
countries encourages citizenship acquisition because of a reduced likelihood of return
migration. Conversely, greater geographical proximity presents more opportunities for
immigrants to maintain frequent, continuous ties with their nearby homelands; this
lowers the cost of return journeys, generating fewer incentives for immigrants to fully
integrate in their host societies.48
Having native-born parents also facilitates naturalization, as this allows foreign-born
children to demonstrate blood ties to their host societies. Citizenship acquisition by
descent – that is, on the basis of one’s parents’ or grandparents’ nationality (also referred
to as jus sanguinis) – is an important and in many countries the primary route to formal
membership in a nation state.49 All countries (including those that rely on jus solis)
have provisions for citizenship acquisition by descent. For example, US government
regulations specify that children born abroad can acquire US citizenship if: (1) both
parents are citizens of the United States, and one of them resided in the United States
before the birth of the child; or if (2) one parent is a citizen of the United States who
resided in the United States for at least ﬁve years before the birth of the child.50 Similarly,
most European countries grant citizenship to foreign-born children if at least one parent
is a citizen of that country.51 This suggests that a foreigner with at least one parent who is
a national of a host country is more likely to hold citizenship of that country, and having
both parents who are native to the host country increases the chances of this even more.52
While geographic distance and native-born parents matter for naturalization, we know
of no theories of immigrant political participation arguing that these factors directly
inﬂuence immigrant political participation. Thus, we have theoretical and empirical
reasons to justify the selection of our instruments; however, we still need to demonstrate
that our instruments meet the assumptions for the IV approach to provide consistent
estimates. The assumption that the instruments are statistically independent from the
disturbance process cannot be veriﬁed in the data directly.53 However, since our model is
47 Valid instruments have a signiﬁcant partial correlation with citizenship, controlling for all the other
determinants of political participation, while being uncorrelated with the error term in the model of
political participation.
48 Philip Q. Yang, ‘Explaining Immigrant Naturalization,’ International Migration Review, 28 (1994),
449–77, pp. 457–8; see also Bueker, ‘Political Incorporation among Immigrants from Ten Areas of
Origin’.
49 Weil, ‘Access to Citizenship’.
50 The United States Ofﬁce of Personnel Management Investigations Service, Citizenship Laws of the
World (The US Ofﬁce of Personnel Management: Washington, DC, 2001).
51 This process, however, is not automatic – parents must register a child and request citizenship within
a speciﬁc period of time (e.g., within ﬁve years in Belgium, or before the age of 22 in Switzerland).
52 Unfortunately, the ESS survey does not include a question measuring parents’ citizenship status –
only their nativity status – and the foreign-born status of parents is of course only a proxy for parents’
citizenship. But given that many native-born parents might have acquired citizenship by birth or
naturalization, this variable allows us to capture citizenship acquisition by descent at least to some extent.
53 Baum, An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata, p. 191.
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over-identiﬁed, we can provide evidence that the instruments are adequate by reporting
test statistics below.54
Geographic distance is measured using geodesic distances between an immigrant’s
country of origin and the new home country based on the dyadic country dataset
developed by the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII).
In our dataset, this variable ranges from 0 for immigrants who come from contiguous
countries to 19,147 kilometres for the most distant country of origin. To measure familial
ties to one’s host country, we rely on two survey items asking whether the respondent’s
father and mother were born in this country. The variable ‘foreign-born parents’ ranges
from 0 if both parents are native-born to 2 if both parents are foreign-born, with 1
indicating that one parent was born abroad and another is a native to the host country.55
We report the results of the two-stage IV estimations in Tables 4 and 5 below. The ﬁrst
stage is designed to predict citizenship status among foreign-born respondents using our
instruments while controlling for all variables speciﬁed in the model of political participation.
Since the IV approach does not allow for multi-level modelling, we follow standard
prescriptions in the statistical literature by also including country ﬁxed effects to account for
cross-country heterogeneity that might be inﬂuencing political participation, and estimate our
models using robust standard errors.56 The second stage then employs an instrumented
citizenship variable as an independent variable in the model of political participation among
foreign-born individuals. These estimations also include country ﬁxed effects but drop
substantive macro-level controls previously used in multi-level models due to collinearity.
TABLE 4 Predicting Citizenship among Foreign-born Individuals in Nineteen
European Countries, 2002–03
Citizenship
Independent variables Low democracy High democracy
Geographical distance from country of origin .009* .001
(.004) (.005)
Foreign-born parents 2.075*** 2.257***
(.017) (.016)
Included exogenous individual-level regressors Yes Yes
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Number of observations 1,307 1,319
Partial R2 for excluded instruments .022 .149
F-statistic for test of excluded instruments 14.65 126.48
F p-value .000 .000
Note: The results are OLS coefﬁcient estimates and their robust standard errors (in parentheses):
*p,0.05, **p,0.01, ***p,0.001.
54 For a similar approach, see Matthew Gabel and Kenneth Scheve, ‘Estimating the Effect of Elite
Communications on Public Opinion Using Instrumental Variables’, American Journal of Political Science,
51 (2007), 1013–28.
55 For more information, see the variable description in the Appendix.
56 See Kevin Arceneaux and David W. Nickerson, ‘Modeling Certainty with Clustered Data: A
Comparison of Methods’, Political Analysis, 7 (2009), 177–90. Note that, due to the inclusion of country
ﬁxed effects, identiﬁcation in this model comes from within-country variation in immigrant background.
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TABLE 5 Instrumental Variable Estimates of Political Participation among Foreign-born Individuals in Nineteen European
Countries, 2002–03














Citizenship (Instrumented) 2.775* .192 .440 .114 2.195** .065
(1.142) (.293) (.570) (.158) (.718) (.186)
Democracy level in country of origin .001 .016 .003 .021 2.001 2.006
(.013) (.069) (.006) (.037) (.009) (.048)
Recent immigrant .268 2.221*** .039 2.084* .201 2.139**
(.204) (.067) (.100) (.034) (.128) (.046)
Discriminated against .532** .367* .188* .257* .334** .108
(.176) (.183) (.085) (.103) (.112) (.117)
Crime victim .283* .517*** .025 .203*** .253** .309***
(.126) (.114) (.063) (.061) (.083) (.076)
Satisfaction with democracy 2.033 2.053* 2.019y 2.010 2.015 2.044**
(.021) (.021) (.010) (.012) (.014) (.014)
Age .050** .024 .021* 2.001 2.030* .024*
(.018) (.018) (.009) (.009) (.012) (.012)
Age squared 2.001*** 2.000y 2.000* 2.000 2.000** 2.000*
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Income .029 .066 .015 .021 .018 .047
(.079) (.066) (.038) (.035) (.053) (.044)
Education .184*** .246*** .106*** .091*** .082** .154***
(.041) (.031) (.022) (.017) (.027) (.021)
Male .119 2.055 .101* .049 .029 2.111y
(.108) (.096) (.050) (.050) (.073) (.064)
Married 2.314* 2.081 2.100y 2.016 2.211** 2.076
(.123) (.100) (.059) (.051) (.081) (.067)
Unemployed .080 .120 .056 .021 .029 .094
(.118) (.111) (.054) (.058) (.081) (.075)
Urban .108y .084* .001 .009 .089* .076**
(.061) (.040) (.030) (.021) (.039) (.027)
Residential stability .003 2.005 .003 .000 2.000 2.005
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TABLE 5 (Continued)














Social connectedness .071* .082** .050** .034* .026 .048*
(.034) (.030) (.016) (.015) (.023) (.022)
Religiosity 2.011 .022 2.004 .011 2.009 .010
(.020) (.018) (.010) (.009) (.013) (.012)
Christian 2.075 2.227* 2.067 2.065 2.011 2.164*
(.151) (.104) (.068) (.053) (.106) (.073)
Muslim .118 .092 2.071 .036 .173 2.126
(.213) (.405) (.096) (.164) (.150) (.266)
Other religions 2.017 2.315 .058 2.183 2.061 2.138
(.356) (.323) (.199) (.161) (.225) (.200)
Foreign-born from an EU country 1.005* .227y .104 .049 .827* .180*
(.512) (.136) (.251) (.076) (.327) (.089)
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 23.105* 2.126 2.805 2.282 22.157* .194
(1.399) (1.566) (.688) (.843) (.896) (1.059)
Number of observations 1,307 1,319 1,321 1,327 1,315 1,322
Hansen J-statistic .313 .737 .018 .448 .788 2.677
x2 (1) p-value .576 .391 .892 .503 .375 .102
Note: The results are IV coefﬁcient estimates and their robust standard errors (in parentheses): yp, 0.1, *p, 0.05, **p, 0.01, ***p, 0.001.
Citizenship is instrumented using geographical distance from foreigner’s country of origin and foreign-born parents. ‘Non-religious’ is the
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Since our key hypothesis focuses on the interactive effects of citizenship and democratic
socialization on political participation, we had to make one additional modiﬁcation to
our original model speciﬁcation. Both stages in the IV models are estimated simultaneously;
as a result, we cannot test for interaction effects with the help of a multiplicative term, given
that the instrumented citizenship variable is produced between the two stages. An alternative
way of dealing with independent variables that are hypothesized to have an interactive effect
with another independent variable on the dependent variable of choice is to stratify the
sample into two subsamples.57 Therefore, we split our sample between immigrants from less
and more democratic regimes using the median value of the democracy score (17.6 on a scale
from 0 to 20) in our dataset to ensure that both samples were of similar size. If our interaction
hypothesis is correct, we should observe a positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect of
citizenship among respondents from less democratic countries, but a smaller or insigniﬁcant
effect among those from more democratic regimes.
The ﬁrst stage of the IV estimations, reported in Table 4, indicates that both instruments
have the anticipated signs and are signiﬁcantly correlated with citizenship.58 We ﬁnd that,
controlling for all predictors of political participation as well as country ﬁxed effects,
immigrants from more geographically distant countries of origin are more likely to enjoy
citizenship status, as are foreigners who have native-born parents. The magnitude of
coefﬁcients, however, depends on whether immigrants come from less or more democratic
regimes: while having two foreign-born parents signiﬁcantly reduces citizenship acquisition
among new arrivals from highly democratic countries, geographic distance is particularly
important for naturalization among foreigners from less democratic regimes.
To systematically assess the validity of our instruments, we rely on several test statistics.
First, the F-statistic for testing excluded instruments is equal to 14.6 for immigrants from
countries with low levels of democracy, and 126.48 for those who arrived from highly
democratic countries. Despite this difference, in both cases the F-statistic is signiﬁcant at
less than 0.001, indicating that our instruments are jointly signiﬁcant. Furthermore, the
Hansen J-test statistic in all models recorded in the second-stage estimations reported in
Table 5 is statistically insigniﬁcant, indicating that the instruments are appropriately
uncorrelated with the error term in the second-stage estimations. Taken together, the
results indicate that the selected instruments are relevant and statistically independent
from the disturbance process, satisfying the key requirements of valid instruments of the
IV approach.
The results of the second-stage estimations, shown in Table 5, are fully in line with our
expectations and the multi-level results reported above. As before, we ﬁnd that citizenship
has a positive effect on immigrant political action, but this effect exists only among
immigrants from less democratic regimes. Moreover, the positive impact of citizenship is
particularly pronounced in the model of uninstitutionalized acts, while it falls short of
conventional levels of statistical signiﬁcance when it comes to predicting institutionalized
participation in politics. Hence, our results indicate that the impact of citizenship on
immigrant political engagement is not spurious but genuine and in the causal direction
57 Eric A. Hanushek and John E. Jackson, Statistical Methods for Social Scientists (San Diego, Calif.:
Academic Press, 1977), p. 101; see also Karen Long Jusko and W. Phillips Shiveley, ‘Applying a Two-Step
Strategy to the Analysis of Cross-National Public Opinion Data’, Political Analysis,13 (2005), 327–44.
58 The statistical signiﬁcance of geographic distance is signiﬁcantly reduced by the inclusion of a control
for whether a foreigner comes from one of the EU-15 countries – a variable designed to distinguish
between more and less desirable immigrants.
Immigrants, Citizenship and Political Action in Europe 503
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123411000378
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 02 Feb 2017 at 12:01:25, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
posited above: citizenship indeed encourages foreigners from less democratic countries to
be more involved in uninstitutionalized political acts.
How much does citizenship matter? To assess our results in greater detail, we calculate
the marginal effect of citizenship on political participation among foreign-born individuals
at various levels of democracy in their countries of origin. Figure 1 plots the magnitude of this
effect for the political action variable and Figure 2 for uninstitutionalized acts, using the























Fig. 1. Marginal effects of citizenship status on political action among foreign-born from countries with low
and high levels of democracy

























Fig. 2. Marginal effects of citizenship status on uninstitutionalized political action among foreign-born from
countries with low and high levels of democracy
Note: Vertical lines indicate 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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levels of political engagement among foreign-born citizens and the black bars participation by
foreign-born non-citizens; the vertical lines show the 95 per cent conﬁdence intervals.59
Calculations of the substantive effects reveal that our key variables of interest indeed have a
sizeable impact on immigrant political participation. Speciﬁcally, Figure 1 indicates that the
political action score for an immigrant who grew up in a country with a low level of democracy
and who is a citizen exceeds the score of a similar individual who is not a citizen by 2.774 points
(12.647 vs. 20.127). In contrast, the gap in the levels of political action between citizens and
non-citizens is reduced to only 0.192 for immigrants from highly democratic countries: the
score for citizens is 1.121, while non-citizens are close behind with a value of 0.929 on the
political action scale. The pattern for uninstitutionalized acts is very similar: while immigrants
from less democratic regimes participate at a level of 2.078, non-citizens have a signiﬁcantly
lower score of20.117. In contrast, the difference between citizens and non-citizens from more
democratic countries is only 0.064 (0.761 vs. 0.697). In short, citizenship has a positive effect on
non-electoral participation among foreign-born respondents, but it is substantively and
statistically signiﬁcant only among those who arrived from less democratic regimes.
DISCUSSION
Across the European democracies, few issues have been more sensitive, explosive or
politically effective in changing party electoral fortunes and arousing public passions than
the topic of immigration and citizenship, perhaps because it touches raw nerves closely
connected to a country’s identity and sovereignty.60 On one hand, sceptics of immigration
fear that changing the racial, ethnic and religious composition of European societies
introduces new social tensions, particularly in hard economic times and when immigrants
are poorly integrated into their host societies. On the other hand, proponents of
immigration believe that ethnic and racial heterogeneity enrich the cultural fabric of
societies and bring important economic beneﬁts such as a younger and more ﬂexible
labour force necessary to replace ageing populations. Considering that migration to
Europe is unlikely to recede,61 migrant integration in their host countries will remain a
pressing issue for governments and citizens alike.
In recent years, a number of European countries have debated the question of how to
treat migrants, and in particular, how to deﬁne citizenship. Virtually every country in the
EU-15 has revisited – though not necessarily revised – its citizenship laws.62 A prominent
example is Germany, which in 1999 fundamentally redeﬁned who was eligible for
citizenship by moving from a pure jus sanguinis to a mixed form of jus sanguinis and
jus soli and for the ﬁrst time giving individuals born in Germany, but not necessarily to
German parents, the right to citizenship.63 This change took place against the background
59 We hold other variables at their means and dichotomous variables at their medians; all country
dummies, except Switzerland, are set to zero.
60 Marc Morje´ Howard, ‘Comparative Citizenship: An Agenda for Cross-National Research’,
Perspectives on Politics, 4 (2006), 443–55, p. 450.
61 Gary P. Freeman, ‘Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States’, International
Migration Review, 29 (1995), 881–913; Christian Joppke, ‘Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted
Immigration’, World Politics, 50 (1998), 266–93; Hein de Haas, ‘Turning the Tide? Why Development
Will Not Stop Migration’, Development and Change, 38 (2007), 819–41.
62 Howard, ‘Comparative Citizenship’, p. 451.
63 Simon Green, ‘Beyond Ethnoculturalism? German Citizenship in the New Millenium’, German
Politics, 9 (2000), 105–24; Marc Morje´ Howard, ‘The Causes and Consequences of Germany’s New
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of increased migration from the former Soviet bloc since the fall of the Berlin Wall, as well
as the presence of a large proportion of residents from Turkey whose children had been
born and raised in Germany. In sharp contrast, the 1990s saw the tightening of citizenship
laws in France, where Charles Pasqua, the French minister for the interior, introduced a
law in 1993 that, among other things, made it more difﬁcult for immigrant children born
in France to become French citizens.64 Similarly, some aspects of citizenship laws became
more restrictive in Ireland and Italy.65
Deﬁning who is eligible for or entitled to citizenship is more than an academic or moral
question, however. In a democracy, it also affects who has the right to choose the
government, stand for ofﬁce and inﬂuence policy making. To better understand the
consequences that granting citizenship has on immigrant political participation in European
democracies, we focused on several important but unanswered questions: do foreign-born
respondents differ with respect to their political engagement from native-born ones? Does it
matter what kinds of political acts we examine? Do the patterns of participation for citizens
diverge from those of non-citizens once we control for whether people are born in another
country? And, ﬁnally, are differences in participation among foreigners due to citizenship or
something else?
Thus, our study sought to shed light on an understudied question – the role of citizenship
versus immigrant status for political participation – but also aimed to put prior, but
contested, arguments about socialization experience to a more stringent test across a wider
range of cases and outside the US context. We argue that, when it comes to political
engagement, it is useful to conceptualize citizenship as a legal and psychological resource
that facilitates and encourages participation. Moreover, we posit that it is important to
distinguish the impact of having or lacking citizenship from the effect of having been born
and raised in a foreign country. Our results show that citizens – regardless of whether they
are foreign-born or native-born – participate in politics at higher rates than non-citizens.
We also argue that a fuller understanding of immigrant political participation and the
impact of citizenship on foreign-born individuals requires that we distinguish the
experiences individuals have as immigrants from the effects we observe as a consequence
of citizenship. Our results lead us to conclude that, while citizenship quite naturally
divides voters from non-voters, its positive impact on participation beyond casting ballots
is contingent on the type of political activity and the level of democratic socialization
immigrants experience in their country of origin. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that citizenship has
a particularly powerful effect in boosting uninstitutionalized participation in politics,
(F’note continued)
Citizenship Law’, German Politics, 17 (2008), 41–62. According to the German Nationality Act of 2000,
children born in Germany to foreign parents acquire German citizenship at birth if at least one parent has
had a legal residence permit in Germany for at least eight years. Children who acquire German citizenship
in this way are allowed to hold dual citizenship until they reach maturity; they are required to choose
between their German and foreign citizenship by the age of 23 (Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson,
Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging (Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2000), p. 93).
64 Amelie Constant, ‘Immigrant Adjustment in France and Impacts on the Natives’, in Klaus
F. Zimmermann, ed., European Migration: What Do We Know? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005),
pp. 263–302, at p. 275. These measures, however, were largely reversed in 1998 by the new Socialist
government and policies have stayed the same since then (Castles and Davidson, Citizenship and
Migration, p. 92; Howard, The Politics of Citizenship in Europe, p. 152).
65 Howard, ‘Comparative Citizenship’, pp. 450–1.
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especially among individuals who were socialized in less democratic countries. This
suggests that granting immigrants citizenship indiscriminately is unlikely to be sufﬁcient
for fostering political engagement among foreign-born residents. Instead, the effects of
citizenship are most apparent among those immigrants whose socialization experiences
are least auspicious for democratic engagement and for acts of participation that are least
institutionalized.
This conclusion may not be politically congenial to everyone. But recall that our results
also show that citizenship has the strongest effect among individuals socialized under
undemocratic regimes and thus counteracts the negative traces that the country of origin
may leave on immigrant participation. Thus, citizenship matters and enhances participation,
but not for everyone and not for every kind of political act. Whether these results generalize
outside of the European context and whether they hold true for all immigrants socialized
under undemocratic regimes or across immigrant generations are of course questions in
need of further investigation. Moreover, given the variety in citizenship regimes, research on
immigrant political behaviour would also beneﬁt from more detailed studies of whether
particular naturalization policies or democratic socialization procedures are more effective in
mobilizing immigrant political engagement than others. For example, we would speculate
that citizenship regimes that contain a heavier component of teaching civic skills and
knowledge are more effective in inculcating new citizens with the resources to become
politically engaged.
Moreover, little is known about how political organizations, especially labour unions
and ethnic community institutions, as well as the nature of migration and residential
concentration of foreigners affect their involvement in politics across European countries.
And while citizenship is one conceptual lens through which to view patterns of immigrant
incorporation, we hasten to add that non-citizens are not all created equal. While some
foreign-born non-citizens – for example, citizens of EU member states – have various
political, economic and social rights, others – third-country nationals – do not, and this may
well affect how they become politically engaged. These are rich but complex questions that
deserve further investigation.
We conclude that, while governments cannot control immigrant socialization experiences
in their country of origin, they are not completely powerless when it comes to shaping the
civic engagement of immigrants. Our results suggest that there is good reason to believe that
citizenship can counteract particularly detrimental effects of growing up in less democratic
countries; as well, they imply that giving immigrants time to adjust to their new environment
and facilitating their learning about democratic governance might be a promising and
straightforward way of producing a high quality of civic life in contemporary democracies.
AP PEND IX : MEASURES AND COD ING
Political Action. Based on the following survey questions: ‘There are different ways of trying to
improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months,
have you done any of the following? (1) Contacted a politician, government or local government
ofﬁcial, (2) Worked in a political party or action group? (3) Worked in another organization or
association? (4) Worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker? (5) Signed a petition? (6) Taken part
in a lawful public demonstration? (7) Boycotted certain products? (8) Deliberately bought certain
products for political, ethical or environmental reasons? (9) Donated money to a political organi-
zation or group? (10) Participated in illegal protest activities?’ The additive index ranges from 0 to
10, with higher values indicating more politically active respondents.
Institutionalized Action. Based on the following survey questions: ‘There are different ways of
trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last
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12 months, have you done any of the following? (1) Contacted a politician, government or local
government ofﬁcial, (2) Worked in a political party or action group? (3) Worked in another
organization or association? (4) Donated money to a political organization or group? (5) Worn or
displayed a campaign badge/sticker?’ The additive index ranges from 0 to 5, with higher values
indicating more politically active respondents.
Uninstitutionalized Action. Based on the following survey questions: ‘There are different ways of
trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last
12 months, have you done any of the following?: (1) Taken part in a lawful public demonstration?
(2) Boycotted certain products? (3) Deliberately bought certain products for political, ethical
or environmental reasons? (4) Participated in illegal protest activities? (5) Signed a petition?’
The additive index ranges from 0 to 5, with higher values indicating more politically active respondents.
Citizen. Based on survey question: ‘Are you a citizen of [country]?’ 1: ‘Yes’, 0 ‘Otherwise’.
Foreign-born. Based on survey question: ‘Were you born in this country?’ 0: ‘Yes’, 1: ‘No or no
answer’.
Foreign-born Citizen. Based on two survey questions: ‘Are you a citizen of [country]?’ and ‘Were
you born in [country]?’ Respondents who answered ‘Yes’ to the ﬁrst question and ‘No’ or gave no
answer to the second were coded 1, Otherwise 0.
Foreign-born Non-citizen. Based on two survey questions: ‘Are you a citizen of [country]?’ and
‘Were you born in [country]?’ Respondents who answered ‘No’ or gave no answer to both questions
were coded 1, Otherwise 0.
Native-born Citizen. Based on two survey questions: ‘Are you a citizen of [country]?’ and ‘Were you
born in [country]?’ Respondents who answered ‘Yes’ to both questions were coded 1, Otherwise 0.
Recent Immigrant. Based on survey question: ‘How long ago did you ﬁrst come to live in [country]?’
5 ‘within last year’, 4 ‘1–5 years ago’, 3 ‘6–10 years ago’, 2 ‘11–20 years ago’, 1 ‘more than 20 years ago’.
Democracy in Country of Origin. Based on the following survey questions: ‘Were you born in
[country]?’ If a respondent answered ‘No’, then the follow-up question was: ‘In which country were
you born?’ – and ‘How long ago did you ﬁrst come to live in [country]?’ Information about
immigrant country of origin and the timing of immigrant arrival was matched up with the polity
scores from the Polity IV dataset http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/. Since the ESS survey was
conducted in 2002 and the timing of immigrant arrival is a categorical variable that captures only
approximate number of years in host country, those who arrived more than twenty years ago were
assigned an average value of their origin country 1972–81 polity score, those who arrived 11–20
years ago an average 1982–91, those who arrived 6–10 years ago an average 1992–96 score, those
who arrived 1–5 years ago an average 1997–2001 score, and those who arrived within the last year
a 2002 score. This generated a variable measuring the level of democracy in immigrant country of
origin that ranges from 0 ‘least democratic regime’ to 20 ‘most democratic regime’ (recoded from the
original polity measure that ranges from 210 to 110).
Geographic Distance from Country of Origin. We used the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) dyadic country data on geodesic distances to measure
geographic distance between foreigner’s host country and country of origin in the ESS data
(in thousands of kilometres). We relied on the CEPII ‘simple distance’ measure calculated following
the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the most important cities/agglomera-
tions (in terms of population). For more information, please see http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/
bdd/distances.htm.
Foreign-born Parents. Based on two survey items measuring whether respondent’s father and
mother are native-born. The variable ranges from 0 to 2, where 0 means that both parents are
native-born, 1 ‘One parent is foreign-born’ and 2 ‘Both parents are foreign-born’.
Discrimination. Based on survey question: ‘Would you describe yourself as being a member of a
group that is discriminated against in this country?’ 1 ‘Yes’, 0 ‘No’.
Crime Victim. Based on survey question: ‘Have you or a member of your household been the
victim of a burglary or assault in the last 5 years?’ 1 ‘Yes’, 0 ‘No’.
Satisfaction with Democracy. Based on survey question: ‘And on the whole, how satisﬁed are you
with the way democracy works in [country]?’ 0 ‘Extremely dissatisﬁed’, 10 ‘Extremely satisﬁed’.
Age. Number of years.
Income. Based on survey question: ‘Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how
you feel about your household’s income nowadays?’ 0 ‘Very difﬁcult on present income’, 1 ‘Difﬁcult
on present income’, 2 ‘Coping on present income’, 3 ‘Living comfortably on present income’.
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Education. The highest level of education achieved: 0 ‘Not completed primary education’,
6 ‘Second stage of tertiary education’.
Male. 1 ‘Male’, 0 ‘Female’.
Married. 1 ‘Married’, 0 ‘Otherwise’.
Unemployed. 1 ‘Not in paid work’, 0 ‘Employed or self-employed’.
Urban. Based on respondent’s description: 0 ‘Farm or home in countryside’, 1 ‘Country village’,
2 ‘Town or small city’, 3 ‘Suburbs or outskirts of big city’, 4 ‘A big city’.
Residential Stability. Number of years in current area of residence.
Social Connectedness. Based on survey question: ‘How often do you meet socially with friends,
relatives or work colleagues?’ 1 ‘Never’, 2 ‘Less than once a month’, 3 ‘Once a month’, 4 ‘Several
times a month’, 5 ‘Once a week’, 6 ‘Several times a week’, 7 ‘Every day’.
Religiosity. Based on survey question: ‘Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion,
how religious would you say you are?’ 11-category variable, ranging from 0 ‘Not at all religious’ to
10 ‘Very religious’.
Religious Denomination. Based on two survey items: ‘Have you ever considered yourself as
belonging to any particular religion or denomination?’ If ‘Yes’ ‘Which one?’ Response categories
were used to create dummy variables for Christians, Muslims, other religions and non-religious.
Foreign-born from an EU Country. Based on the following survey questions: ‘Were you born in
[country]?’ If a respondent said ‘No’, then the follow up question was, ‘In which country were you
born?’ Response categories were coded as 1 if a foreigner reported that he or she was born in a
country that was an EU member state at the time of the survey (2002–03) and 0 ‘Otherwise’.
Foreign Population Size. Percentage of total population. Source: Eurostat 2001 Census data.
Citizenship Policies in Host Country. Citizenship Policy Index.66 Additive index based on three
indicators: (a) citizenship by birth 0 ‘Not allowed’ 1 ‘Allowed’; (b) residency requirement for
naturalization: countries that require at least ten years are coded 0 ‘Difﬁcult’; those that require six
to nine years of residence are coded 1 ‘Medium’, and those that require ﬁve years or less are coded
2 ‘Easy’; (c) acceptance of dual citizenship for immigrants: 0 ‘No’ 1 ‘Yes’. The resulting variable
ranges from 0 ‘Restrictive citizenship policies’ to 6 ‘Liberal citizenship policies’.
New Democracy. Dichotomous variable: respondents from two newer democracies in our sample –
the Czech Republic and Slovenia – were assigned a value of 1, otherwise 0.
GDP per Capita. Based on purchasing power parity (PPP) in constant 2000 international dollars
(in 1000 s) in 2002. Source: World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank (2005) CD-ROM.
Economic Growth. Annual percentage growth rate of GDP in 2002. Source: World Bank Devel-
opment Indicators, World Bank (2005) CD-ROM.
Government Expenditure (% of GDP). General government ﬁnal consumption expenditure as a
percentage of GDP in 2002. It includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods
and services (including compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditure on national
defence and security, but excludes government military expenditure that is part of government
formation. Source: World Bank Development Indicators, World Bank (2005) CD-ROM.
66 Howard, The Politics of Citizenship in Europe, see also Howard, ‘Comparative Citizenship’.
Citizenship’ and Marc Morje´ Howard, ‘Variation in Dual Citizenship Policies in the Countries of the EU’,
International Migration Review, 39 (2005), 697–720.
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